FMSAC 118-65 S 8 March 1965 Answers to questionf for McCone meeting with Elie Abel

- 1. What is the best current estimate based on information since the crisis about Soviet motivation in putt8ng MRBM's into Cuba? Has the I/C come to any hard conclusions in light of subseq evidence?
- A. The deployment of MRBM's and IRBM's to Cuba by the Soviet Union which was preceded by the emplacement of an island-wide surface=to-air missile defense was a well-planned attempt to add significantly to the Soviet strategic posture vis-a-vis the U.S. This force would have given the USSR a significant strike cxapability against which the US would have had no BMEWS warning. It was a major military investment by the USSR with the planning having commenced in late 1961 or early 1962 and the execution stage put into motion in the Spring of 1962. It was obvious that these strategic weapons, which were reliable, modern attack weapons, were to be manned and controlled by the Soviet Union and were not destined for transfer to Cuba.
- 2. Did the first pictures (Oct 16-15) show any missiles or just scars in the earth and other evidence that site construction might be under way?
- A. This question can be answered in 2 parts MRBM's and IRBM'sm. MRBM the photographic missions on 14 and 15 Oct disclosed the presence of at least one Sov regiment consisting of 8 launchers and 16 SS-4 MRBM's deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites. At that time, the equipment that was noted in place was unrevetted and continuing improvement of these sites was noted subsequent to 14 Oct. IRBM construction of the fixed softsites for the SS-5 IRBM's were also detected by photographic missions on the 14th and 15th of Oct. No SS-5 missiles were detected in this or any subsequent photography.
- 3. When was the construction started?

However, construction a	Aug disclosed no construction activit uanajay and Sagua La Grande area. ctivity was noted in these areas in ded that the actual construction of the state Sant	25X1
Just soft sites began 1	late Sebt.	1
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		Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000200090023-9	25X1 25X1
25X1		X. equipment for	r 25X1
:	25X1	the IRBM sites began arriving in Cuba as early as 8 August.	
		4. At the time of the crisis, the operating assumption was that the Russians would not have put missiles in without be prepared to arm them with nuclear warheads. Any evidence they were ever delivered to Cuba (or diverted)? A. Prior to Cuban missile deployment we had some knowledge regarding the composition of Sov Strategic Missile Orgs.	eing 25X1
	25X1		
25X1		It is poss that the nucl warheads were a installed in these nose cones and thus were actually at the	
25X1		sites.	
	25X1		

/s/ Carl E. Duckett, D/FMSAC